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View all search resultsAs non-kinetic warfare redefines modern conflict, Jakarta must bridge the gap between its digital ambitions and its defensive realities to secure national sovereignty.
eyond the joint United States-Israeli airstrikes targeting Iranian military assets and nuclear sites on Feb. 28, reports reveal that Tehran also experienced simultaneous non-kinetic attacks. Experts and observers have dubbed these "one of the most extensive cyber disruptions in modern history."
Investigations disclosed that multiple Iranian news websites and the widely used BadeSaba calendar application were compromised; the latter displayed messages directing protesters to safe locations and calling for personnel of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to surrender.
Furthermore, reports indicated that nationwide internet connectivity in Iran plummeted to just 1 percent of ordinary levels as of March 2, suggesting the high likelihood of a coordinated external cyberattack, an intentional internal shutdown, or a combination of both.
The cyber elements of the weekend attack were reminiscent of recent incidents, namely the US strikes on Iranian nuclear sites on June 22, 2025, and the US operation in Venezuela on Jan. 3, 2026. These events highlight how non-kinetic disruptions have become pivotal to modern military campaigns, specifically in paralyzing command and control (C2) capabilities and preventing the immediate deployment of military assets.
Additionally, these operations demonstrate the devastating impact of cyber disruptions on nations lacking adequate defensive infrastructure. Despite being geographically removed from the conflict, the current trend offers at least two critical lessons for Indonesia’s cybersecurity and defense.
The first lesson centers on the necessity of a comprehensive national cybersecurity strategy, policy and doctrine that prioritizes both prevention and recovery.
Cybersecurity experts argue that the pre-airstrike attacks on Iran were likely intended to disrupt Tehran’s C2 capabilities, particularly those governing the IRGC’s missile and drone operations. By crippling these networks, US-Israeli forces expected to delay, if not entirely prevent, Iran from detecting the incoming threat and coordinating a response. This underscores a vital reality: while Tehran’s military doctrine has focused on integrated cyber and electronic systems, the failure to prevent initial breaches of its detection and air defense systems significantly compromised its retaliatory capabilities.
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